New Delhi and Seoul Strengthen Ties

Posted on August 31, 2011 by Prabuddha

India’s bilateral relations with the Republic of Korea attained a new high when the two sides signed an agreement on nuclear energy technology on 25 July, 2011 during Indian President Pratibha Patil’s visit to Seoul. This is the second key agreement signed between the two countries following the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) of 2009 which came into effect a year later. While the two agreements sport a major uptrend in fostering New Delhi-Seoul bilateral relations, the signing of the latest deal marks Korea’s entry to India’s nuclear energy space as the latter’s ninth partner. Besides, Patil and her Korean counterpart Lee Myung-Bak discussed ways to “add substance and content to India-Korea relations”, as regards their “strategic partnership”. The deal has been described “historic” by Myung-Bak.

The agreement with Korea is similar to other civil nuclear cooperation deals that India has struck with various other countries. The agreement would enable Koran firms to enter Indian market and partner with Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) of India for building nuclear power stations. The Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO), has already been seeking cooperation with NPC to enter the Indian nuclear power plant construction space. The agreement, signed by Srikumar Banerjee, secretary, department of atomic energy and Kim Sung-Hwan, minister of foreign affairs and trade, for their respective sides, would be of common advantage to both countries and was thus a win-win situation. Only three rounds of talks were required to reach the agreement, the last in December 2010.

It could be recalled that Seoul and New Delhi had started talks over civil nuclear cooperation at a meeting between President Myung-Bak and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Hanoi summit of Asean in October 2010. Korea intends to export nuclear technology to India and its target is to export 80 such reactors to several countries by the end of 2030. Korea, at present, has 21 reactors which provide over 39 per cent of its power. It plans to increase the number of reactors to 56 by 2020. While India plans to erect over 40 nuclear reactors by 2032, Korea intends to export the light water reactor technology.

Korea, expectedly, is upbeat on emerging as a major player in the arena of international nuclear commerce. Korean firms, in 2009, had won an $18.6 billion order for building four nuclear power plants in UAE, beating the French, Japanese and the US in the bidding process. Korea, in fact, has established itself as a major supplier of cheap nuclear hardware. From India’s point of view, the deal would provide an alternative supply chain as regards nuclear reactors, besides components including giant forgings.

The importance of the Indo-Korean nuclear agreement lies on that fact that India would be able to tap Korea’s nuclear expertise. This would take off the pressure from the Indo-Japan nuclear deal. India is fully aware of domestic compulsions that bog down Japanese premier Naoto Kan following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The Kan government has decided to discard nuclear energy in phased manner so as to allay the anti-nuclear sentiment of the public. New Delhi is eager to allow negotiations with Tokyo proceed at the pace the latter is comfortable with. Importance of the deal with Tokyo is dependent on the fat that Japan holds licenses for key components of a nuclear reactor and without it, several western countries will find it hard to the enter India’s nuclear space.

Other than nuclear and economic cooperation, Indo-Korean relations are developing on other levels also. Patil discussed possible cooperation in peaceful use of outer space. New Delhi is looking ahead to launch Korean satellites on its rockets. External affairs minister had expressed interests on the same line during his visit to Seoul in June 2010. Korea has conceded that Indian “facilities are of high quality and are available at competitive prices.”

Defence ties are looking up as well, particularly given the fast deteriorating security situation in East and the South China Sea. Besides coast guard and naval cooperation, there are several prospects for co-producing defence equipment, joint research and development and transfer of technology. New Delhi also plans to depute a defence attaché to its embassy in Seoul. Going ahead, the two countries can engage themselves in joint maritime exercises. This would go to a considerable extent to discount the Chinese presence not only in the vicinity of Korea but the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean as well.

India is also seeking greater access to the Korean market for IT services and Indian pharmaceuticals. Another major point of Patil’s visit was signing of the MoU on media exchange and a deal on administrative arrangements for providing social security to those working in Korea and India.

Korean companies have found the investment climate in India to be attractive. The ideal approach for the Korean firms will be to make India a base for manufacturing operations, including its exports to third countries. Both New Delhi and Seoul have agreed to work unitedly for reaching a maritime shipment accord as well as a treaty for preventing double taxation at the earliest possible date that will be beneficial to both the sides. Other than these, a series of several cultural events are on the cards to mark 2011 as the year of bilateral cultural exchanges between the two countries. If these objectives are to be realised, the frequency of direct India-Korea flights needs to be increased. This would enable enhanced people-to-people contact. As a result, the present agreement on civil aviation between the two countries needs amendment for extending “fifth freedom rights” to each other’s carriers.

It can be undoubtedly said that though other issues including defence, civil aviation, culture and economic relations were on agenda, the key point in Patil’s Seoul visit was conclusion of the agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. The deal is slated to extend the robustness to Indo-Korean bilateral ties. If the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was the most significant achievement of 2010, then the nuclear deal was the defining outcome of 2011.

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Indian Oil Imports and the Saudi Rivalry

Posted on August 30, 2011 by Prabuddha

New Delhi has resumed payments to the country’s second largest crude oil supplier, Iran, following an elongated stalemate during which the payments were suspended because of the UN embargo imposed on Tehran. Reports claim that over $100 million has already been paid off and the issue has been “amicably sorted out”.

A critical question, however, has risen over the issue. Is the new oil deal between India and Saudi Arabia an attempt of the latter to exploit the Iran-India dispute?

Riyadh has reportedly struck a deal with New Delhi for supplying three million barrels of extra crude. The move comes in the wake of Iran announcing the suspension of crude to India because of the payment row that has been lingering for many months now. The dispute, in fact, is another instance of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry being played out in South Asia.

At the core of the India-Iran problem is the method of payment. It’s not that India is unwilling to pay. India and Iran had an arrangement under a clearing house system for several years that’s no longer applicable as the sanctions against Iran have become stringent over the years. While Tehran is trying to revert back to the older system, New Delhi clearly favours a more transparent system. Hence, the discontent and New Delhi’s inability to facilitate the payments.

Iran, now, is mounting pressure on India about suspending crude. However, the entry of the Saudis is a message to Tehran that it has other options. Saudis, on the other hand, are exploiting the standoff to the fullest. From their view, they can step in for reducing the Indian dependency over Iran that would be an undeniable blow to the latter’s foreign earnings.

The Riyadh-Tehran rivalry mostly centres in the Persian Gulf where Iran has an upper hand. Saudi Arabia is looking for ways to counter the Iranian moves in regions beyond the Persian Gulf. One such region is South Asia. The Iranians and Saudis have already played it out in Pakistan as well as the wider Afghanistan. In the New Delhi-Tehran crude payment row, Riyadh is trying to extract the advantages of another fault line of Iran. Should Riyadh be able to steer New Delhi towards its orbit, it would be a major gain for the former against their arch rivals. It’s not as if New Delhi is overwhelmingly willing to dump Tehran in favour of Riyadh. India, characteristically, favours a diversified foreign policy approach especially in the sphere of geopolitics, security and economics.

Though it would be too premature to predict whether India would completely dump Iran to favour Saudi Arabia, it could be said nevertheless that as long as there’s a row between India and Iran, the Saudis would take full advantage of it. Only when a new mechanism to disburse the payment is achieved that the dispute would no longer be advantageous to the Saudis. But till such time, the payment row is up for grabs for Riyadh, already earning international flak for allegedly sheltering the now hounded out Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.

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A Different South Asia

Posted on August 29, 2011 by Prabuddha

South Asia, as a region, usually evokes an image of a place which is afflicted by several instances of violent religious extremism where militant outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Al Qaeda and the Taliban are active. The region has also gained infamy where a clandestine nuclear proliferation, in connivance with the AQ Khan network active from the heartland of Pakistan, has taken place. Besides, it is already beset with the enduring Indo-Pak rivalry and hostility, regardless of the occasional peace initiative. The numerous attacks of terror, launched within India, with alleged patronage, incitement and support of Islamabad, are a known manifestation of the rivalry. 

While this newsworthy South Asia remains a harsh reality, what’s heartening is that not the whole region is in a delirious state. There is another part of South Asia which is attempting to overcome common problems and forge a fresh situation which is conducive to progress. India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives and Bhutan comprise this changing countenance of South Asia. Nepal, however, isn’t a constituent of this group as it’s still struggling to draft a constitution and instate democracy. 

Sri Lanka, of late, has made notable progress following the end of its long decades of insurgency, led by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Colombo has compounded a free trade agreement with New Delhi and Indo-Sri Lanka bilateral trade is already booming. Indian multinationals and investment firms have played a vital role towards the economic growth of the island nation. Though the “ethnic war” is now over and the political demands of the Tamil populace are yet to be resolved, the country nonetheless is doing well for itself in the economic sphere.  

But the most noteworthy development in the region, however, appears to be taking place between Bangladesh and India. The former, once, was threatening to surface as a major troublemaker during the BNP-led four party coalition rule. The party’s major compatriot in the then government included Jamaat-e-Islami, with connections to regional and international terror networks, and now standing trials for its involvement in crimes against humanity during the country’s liberation war of 1971. The coalition’s biasness towards Islamist radicalism, catered to the fillip of religious intolerance and the subsequent extremism in the country. The abrupt upsurge of fundamentalism even led to apprehensions that Bangladesh was well on path to become the next Afghanistan.

Sincere efforts, however, were made to shackle extremism in Bangladesh. This happened, to a large extent, under the last caretaker government headed by Fakhruddin Ahmed. But a more decisive step against extremism was achieved under the Sheikh Hasina government which assumed office with a whopping three fourths mandate in the December 2008 elections. Armed with the overwhelming majority, the Hasina-led 14 party grand alliance government came down heavily on the fundamentalist forces. It also busted a number of modules and sleeper cells of Pakistan-backed terror groups. Action was taken against Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), the domestic Islamist terror group.

Indo-Bangla relations have improved significantly ever since Dhaka’s crackdown on anti-India outfits active on its soil. Dhaka has already handed over many insurgent leaders to New Delhi who had sought refuge in Bangladesh and were waging covert offensives in Northeast India.

New Delhi has taken note of this cooperative effort extended by Dhaka. Indo-Bangla bilateral relations attained a new high when in January 2010, Sheikh Hasina came down to New Delhi. It marked a new era in the relations between the two sides. Over the last 18 months, following Hasina’s visit to New Delhi, both sides have adopted several steps in the forward direction. The plan for resolving the outstanding bilateral issues viz. sharing of the common river waters, disputes over land boundary and addressing the unfavourable trade deficit on Bangladesh’s side was drawn up. A joint Indo-Bangla group has already completed survey of the 4,156 km long common boundary and has identified the lands in adverse possession to be handed over to each other. The boundary, which remained enforced via verbal consensus only, has been demarcated with 1,129 strip maps. Beginning last week, the Bangladeshi high commissioner to New Delhi Tarique Karim and his Indian counterpart Rajit Mitter, have begun attesting their signatures to the maps, thereby giving it official and legal recognition.

Some understanding has also been reached as regards the issue of transit. India, for long, have had demanded transit through Bangladeshi heartland for accessing its seven landlocked states in the northeast. This was, however, denied by the past governments in Dhaka, though New Delhi had enjoyed the facility till 1965. Dhaka, at present, plans to involve Nepal and Bhutan in the transit corridor. It has given access to both the Himalayan countries, to use the Mongla and Chittagong ports. Bhutanese vehicles will be using Indian land for reaching Bangladesh. An agreement was reached when the Indian foreign minister SM Krishna visited Dhaka. Krishna also signed an agreement regarding the protection of Indian investments to Bangladesh. With Indian multinationals planning to invest over $3.5 billion in the near future in Bangladesh, the country’s eastern neighbour would be pushed down the avenue of further economic growth. This, in all probability, would furnish Hasina’s Vision 2021 document, in which the Bangladeshi premier has set the goal to elevate her country to the middle-income group. Further, New Delhi is likely to extend unilateral trade concessions to Dhaka when the Indian premier Manmohan Singh visits the country in September.

This is a new and fresh beginning for a key part of South Asia. Though New Delhi has stepped up its efforts to build infrastructure besides extend ding a humanitarian hand to Afghanistan, India’s northern neighbour and Pakistan still continue to be engaged in ethnic and religious conflict. On the contrary, the remaining part of South Asia seems to be keen on checking and going beyond such tendencies. They also seem to be dedicated in according priority to regional integration and economic growth. This has given hope that cooperation would soon appear as a model even for those parts in the region where stability and peace have so far been elusive.

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Indian Navy Bolsters its Eastern Muscle

Posted on August 26, 2011 by Prabuddha

The Indian navy has been pumping up its muscles along the eastern seaboard, albeit slowly but steadily.

For several decades, the eastern command had played the proverbial second fiddle to its western peer, which has its headquarters in Mumbai. Considered to be the navy’s “sword arm”, the western command had garnered majority of the attention and the resultant resources of strategic planners.

The increased attention being cast on the eastern command, has been prompted partly by the threats centring on Beijing’s alarming naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. However, it’s also the part of India’s two decade-long effort to train its economic, diplomatic and military synergies eastwards as a part of its “Look East” policy. Moreover, the eastward orientation is aimed at aiding India’s emergence as a significant player as regards the Asia-Pacific security apparatus.

Indian navy is the fifth largest in the world and comprises three commands, namely the western, eastern and southern. The eastern command, headquartered at Visakhapatnam, is also the home to the submarine arm. Besides, a tri-services command was established at Port Blair in 2001.

The eastern command has expanded remarkably in the recent years. While in 2005 it had 30 warships, in 2011, the number has risen to 50. In fact, about a third of the navy’s entire fleet is positioned in the eastern command and it’s poised to increase further. Also, the country’s only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, is slated to be stationed at the eastern command when the refurbished Russian carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, renamed INS Vikramaditya, joins the western fleet. All the Rajput-class guided missile destroyers, five in number, that were with the western fleet, have already joined the eastern seaboard.

The navy’s only acquisition from the US, the amphibious USS Trenton, renamed INS Jalashwa, is set to join the eastern command. The warship will be soon joined by the indigenously built stealth frigates INS Sahyadri, INS Shivalik and INS Satpura as also the US-made P-8I long-range Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, besides the Italy-made INS Shakti, the new fleet tanker. The command is slated to take charge of the country’s nuclear submarines as well. The INS Arihant, built at Visakhapatnam, is already undergoing sea trials and two other nuclear submarines, are also under construction.

The eastern command, with bases at Kolkata and Visakhapatnam, would soon get a forward base at Tuticorin. It will also have an operational turnaround in Paradeep. Besides the naval air-stations at Rajali and Dega, the command has the new INS Parundu at Uchipuli. The last named has UAVs deployed.

The gap between the eastern and the western command appears to have narrowed down. Given the former’s rising strength and profile, the navy has recently upgraded the rank of eastern command’s chief of staff to three-star, which is equal to the western command.

The eastern cost of the country faces six littorals – Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia – across the Bay of Bengal. The Andamans are nestled midway between the east coast and Straits of Malacca.

But it’s China, though neither an Indian Ocean nor a Bay of Bengal littoral, which has secured a presence in the said waters via establishing strong defence, economic and defence relationships with the littoral states. This includes building naval and commercial port infrastructure to serve both military and civilian use. Besides Gwadar in Pakistan, just across the Arabian Sea, Beijing is building ports at Chittagong in Bangladesh and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. It has also upgraded several ports in Myanmar including Kyaukpyu, Bassein, Yangon, Sittwe and Mergui. It is also building radar, refuel and refit facilities at naval bases in Akyab, Zadetkyi, Hainggyi, and Mergui.      

While the Sino presence in these ports could be presently benign, analysts have warned that Beijing could use these ports for strategic and military purposes. Given the substantial influence that China commands in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, its demands may well be conceded, they caution.

That will usher the Chinese navy to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. Analysts, though, are of the opinion that China still has to traverse numerous years, if not decades, to bear the capability to support sustained naval deployment along the Indian Ocean. However, it’s this threatening possibility that has led New Delhi to beef up the eastern command.

In the beef up process, India’s trade with East and Southeast Asia has increased manifold. Its security-related engagements have increased not only with sates like Vietnam and Singapore, but also with Australia, Korea and Japan. The navy has played a crucial role to achieve such expansion. Whereas in the 1990s the navy was largely confined to the west of the Straits of Malacca, the past decade has witnessed the navy’s foray to the Pacific as well. It, interestingly, is engaging in several multilateral exercises the waters off North East Asia.

Though India is sporting increased capability to impact Asia-Pacific security architecture, it’s still not a dominant player in the region. It’s not marginal either. Its increased attention on the eastern commands aims at flexing its muscle as to become a key contributor for shaping the emergence of the Asian order.

But what sort of a player New Delhi wants to become? One which projects itself as a tool in others’ hand for containing Beijing or one which pushes for a cooperative Asian security architecture which puts Asia’s concerns before the interests of outsiders?

Much of the worldwide discourse on an evolving Asian security apparatus, till date, has been focussed on the issue of maritime rivalry and containment of the Beijing influence. However, there’s scope for further cooperation given the shared threats that the countries in the region face from terrorists and pirates to choke points and sea lanes. The waters, especially that of Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, extend a potential sphere of collaboration among the naval powers of Asia. This could be exploited for building a new and cooperative Asian order, something which could be of use to all the countries of the region.

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Time to Act Tough With Islamabad

Posted on August 25, 2011 by Prabuddha

Ever since terror kingpin Osama bin Laden was unearthed and gunned down in close proximity of the premier training institute of the Pakistan army, Islamabad has had to deal with several troubling questions. As it seems, Laden had been residing at Abbottabad in plain sight for over six years. Even after nearly three months of the incident it remains unclear whether Pak military had colluded with the Al Qaeda or had really overlooked his compound. Had the military knew its whereabouts, it must have kept Islamabad in the dark. Had it no clue, it meant that hunting down the Al Qaeda chief wasn’t its top priority.

In either way, the incident has put into stark perspective the pertinent need for addressing the gross imbalance of power between Pakistan’s politicians and generals, whose respective opinions on the terrorism diverge. Whereas the civilian government led by Pakistan People’s Party, condemns violent extremism unequivocally, the military still continues to view several outfits viz the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network as strategic tools.

Suspecting Islamabad’s collusion in hiding Laden, many US lawmakers, including Susan Collins (R-Me.) and senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), have questioned the utility behind extending additional aid to Pakistan. Others like representatives Allen West (R-Fla.) and Ted Poe (R-Tex.) have even authored a legislation to stop US assistance to Pakistan, should the latter’s deceit in hiding Laden be proved. Islamabad, however, needs international assistance for keeping its economy afloat and caters to the long-term developmental needs. Besides, at a US Senate Committee hearing on foreign relations recently, senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) urged caution when he said, “A legitimate analysis concludes that it is undeniable that our relationship with Pakistan has helped us pursue our security goals.”  

Washington has to take this opportunity for resetting its ties with Islamabad. First, with the Pak military under increased global and domestic scrutiny, the administration must demand it severs links with militant outfits or risk losing the security assistance. Meanwhile, Congress must unapologetically enforce the condition clauses contained in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009, which links military aid to a certification by the US secretary of state that that Islamabad isn’t allowing its territories to be used by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or their affiliates and that the Pak military is under civilian control.   

Second, the US must also start cooperating earnestly with and supporting Pak’s civilian institutes, including the law enforcement agencies. Most of the country’s major political parties, Parliament and the civil society share the US interest in uprooting militancy and extremism from Pak soil and prefer peace with India than hostility. But since Laden’s annihilation, the Pak military has been publicly defiant and combative, whereas the government has expressed its intention to work with the US, assuring to investigate how Laden had set camp in the country’s heartland. 

Regardless of the shortcomings, Pak’s civilian and democratic institutions require US backing. After all, in the long run, only an economically run Pakistan would be able to avert militants and terrorists finding safe refuge on its land.

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